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I. INTRODUCTION 
The morning before a law school final examination, Jewish 
students received swastikas in their campus mailboxes. l At an un-
dergraduate party, blackened-faced fraternity brothers held a mock 
slave auction.2 Dozens of posters at a university campus urged stu-
dents to murder gays and lesbians.3 In a university newspaper ed-
itorial, a student accused female students of overreacting to an 
article entitled "100 ways to maim a woman."4 An African-American 
student viewed the following on the classroom blackboard: "A mind 
I Harvard University Kennedy School of Government lecture, ARCO Forum, Racial 
and Sexual Harassment v. First Amendment on Campus (Oct. 19, 1989) (comment by former 
City University of New York Law School student) (videotape available at Harvard University, 
Kennedy School of Government Media Services) [hereinafter Harvard Lecture). 
2 Cultural Revolutions, CHRONICLES MAGAZINE, July 1989, at 5. 
3 Metz, Bad Apples, Evil Deeds, STUDENT LAWYER, Feb. 1990, at 33. 
4 Harvard Lecture, supra note 1 (comment by Professor Louise Fitzgerald, Assistant 
Professor of Psychology at the University of Illinois, regarding an incident at the University 
of Iowa). 
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is a terrible thing to waste-especially on a nigger."5 These illustrate 
a few of the many reported incidents of recent racist, sexist, 
homophobic, and anti-Semitic acts on college campuses. The Na-
tional Institute Against Prejudice and Violence reports that racial 
incidents have occurred at approximately 250 colleges and univer-
sities since the fall of 1986.6 Furthermore, the Institute notes that 
this figure does not account for the forty to fifty percent of all 
incidents that go unreported by the victims of racial violence.7 Be-
cause no quantifiable figure exists for comparative purposes, it is 
inconclusive whether these statistics reflect an increase over past 
years.8 Such incidents, however, do reflect a serious problem on 
college campuses today.9 Between twenty to twenty-five percent of 
all minority students have been victimized at least once during their 
years on campus. lO 
In response to this harassment, several universities have taken 
steps to protect target groups from a hostile, intimidating environ-
ment. II Universities have added ethnic studies requirements to their 
curricula, promoted cultural diversity workshops tOi elevate stu-
dents' awareness, and recruited more minority faculty.12 Some uni-
versities have attempted to counteract the abusive speech and ac-
5 Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus (article forth-
coming in DUKE L.J., 1990, no. 3). 
6 H. EHRLICH, CAMPUS ETHNOVIOLENCE AND THE POLICY OPTIONS iii (National Institute 
Against Prejudice & Violence, Institute Report No.4, 1990). 
7 Telephone interview with Howard Ehrlich, Research Director of the National Institute 
Against Prejudice & Violence (Sept. 26, 1990). 
8 Id. Despite the large number of incidents, one cannot conclude that they are increasing 
as there is no baseline data from which to compare. In addition, as universities have developed 
procedures for dealing with such incidents, victims have had a place to turn, which has 
increased reporting of incidents. Id. 
9 See generally Note, Racism and Race Relations in the University, 76 VA. L. REV. 295 (1990) 
(recent account of racist speech in the university context and its serious consequences). 
10 Colleges Tackle Increase in Racism of Campuses, L.A. Times, Apr. 30, 1989, § I, at 36, 
col. 1. 
11 See Harvard Lecture, supra note 1 (comments by Professor Sedler [hereinafter Sedler 
Commentsi, Professor of Law at Wayne State University Law School and co-counsel for 
plaintiff in Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (graduate 
student challenged the constitutionality of the anti-harassment policy at the University of 
Michigan)); see, e.g., Policy Statement, The University of Michigan Interim Policy on Discrim-
ination and Discriminatory Conduct by Students in the University Environment, Sept. 1989 
[hereinafter Revised Policy]. An excerpt from the policy's preamble states that discriminatory 
"behavior threatens to destroy the environment of tolerance and mutual respect which must 
prevail if a university is to fulfill its purpose." !d. at 1. For a discussion of this policy, see infra 
note 15 and accompanying text. 
12 Leslie, Lessons From Bigotry 101, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 25, 1989, at 48. 
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tions by establishing racism hotlines. 13 Moreover, in an attempt to 
prevent prejudicial speech, some universities have enacted anti-
harassment disciplinary policies. 14 The latter of these methods, the 
enactment of disciplinary policies to punish racist, sexist, anti-
Semitic, and homophobic speech and conduct, poses senous 
constitutional questions in the context of public universItIes. 
These policies delineate parameters for punishable speech and 
conduct, establish adjudicatory mechanisms to deal with 
registered complaints, and set forth sanctions. IS Some policies 
13 Id. 
14 Wilson, Colleges' Anti-Harassment Policies Bring Controversy over Free-Speech Issues, Chron-
icle of Higher Educ., Oct. 4, 1989, at AI, col. 2. Schools that have adopted or are considering 
such policies include: Arizona State University, Brown University, Eastern Michigan Univer-
sity, Emory University, Pennsylvania State University, Stanford University, Tufts University 
(withdrawn Oct. 4, 1989), Trinity College, University of California, University of Connecticut 
(Storrs), University of Michigan, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill), University of 
Pennsylvania, University of Texas (Austin), University of Wisconsin. Id. at A38, col. 5. 
15 For example, the University of Michigan initially published a policy sta"tement on 
April 15, 1988, entitled Discrimination and Discriminatory Harassment by Students in the 
University Environment [hereinafter Initial Policy] which classified the following as discrim-
inatory and subject to discipline if done in an educational or academic center: 
1. Any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on 
the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, 
ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status, and that: 
a. Involves an express or implied threat to an individual's academic efforts, 
employment, participation in University sponsored extracurricular activities or per-
sonal safety; or 
b. Has the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering with an 
individuah academic efforts, employment, participation in University sponsored 
extracurricular activities or personal safety; or 
c. Creates an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for educational 
pursuits, employment or participation in University sponsored extracurricular ac-
tivities. 
Initial Policy, supra, at 2. The Board of Regents later revised their Initial Policy in response 
to Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 866 (E.D. Mich. 1989), which had ruled 
that the policy was unconstitutionally overbroad. Telephone interview with Elsa Kircher Cole, 
General Counsel, University of Michigan (October 3, 1989) [hereinafter Cole Interview]. The 
Revised Policy, enacted in September of 1989 and as yet untested, replaced the above wording 
with the following: 
[T]he University has a compelling interest in assuring an environment in which 
learning may thrive. Such an environment requires free and unfettered discussion 
of the widest possible nature, encouraging expression of all points of view. The 
University acknowledges that the frank and open discussion of social, cultural, 
artistic, religious, scientific and political issues may be disturbing and even hurtful 
for some individuals. In such instances, the principle of free exchange and inquiry 
takes precedence as it is so fundamental to the educational enterprise. 
Discrimination and discriminatory harassment have no place in this educational 
enterprise. Physical acts or threats or verbal slurs, invectives or epithets referring to 
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differentiate among three "zones of protection:" the public 
forum (newspapers, park areas), the educational and aca-
demic areas, and the dormitories. 16 Others do not specify 
location. 17 Some policies provide exam pIes of sanctionable 
behavior.IB 
an individual's race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, 
ancestry, age or handicap made with the purpose of injuring the person to whom 
the words or actions are directed and that are not made as a part of a discussion or 
exchange of an idea, ideology or philosophy are prohibited. 
Revised Policy, supra note 11, at 2. Both the Initial and Revised Policies strongly urged 
informal mechanisms of dispute resolution but at the same time constructed a formal disci-
plinary proceeding, which required filing a formal complaint and providing notice, and 
which established requirements with respect to the hearing process itself. Initial Policy at 5; 
Revised Policy, supra note 11, at 4-5. Both policies establish a range of sanctions, from formal 
reprimand, public service, and education, to suspension or expulsion. Initial Policy at 7-8; 
Revised Policy, supra note 11, at 6. 
16 The Initial and Revised Policies delineate between these three zones. In the first zone, 
the public forum areas, "[t]he broadest range of speech ... will be tolerated." Initial Policy, 
supra note 15, at 2; Revised Policy, supra note 11, at 2. The second category, the educational 
and academic centers, is discussed supra note 15. The policy for the dormitories, the third 
category, is based on a contractual arrangement with respect to the students' leases. Initial 
Policy, supra note 15, at 3; Revised Policy, supra note 11, at 3. 
17 The policy of the University of Wisconsin [hereinafter University of Wisconsin policy], 
Chapter UWS § 17.06(2) (a), at 65, mentions many instances in which it may discipline its 
students, but does not distinguish location. It provides sanctions for: 
Id. 
racist or discriminatory comments, epithets or other expressive behavior directed at 
an individual or on separate occasions at different individuals, or for physical 
conduct, if such comments, epithets, other expressive behavior or physical conduct 
intentionally: 
1. Demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, 
national origin, ancestry or age of the individual or individuals; and 
2. Create an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for education, 
university related work or other university-authorized activity. 
In March 1990, a lawsuit was filed that challenged the constitutionality of the University 
of Wisconsin policy. UWM Post v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., No. 90-C-
0328 (E.D. Wis. 1989). The plaintiffs, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claim that 
the policy violates the first and fourteenth amendments of the U.S. Constitution and sections 
of the Wisconsin Constitution, and is overbroad and vague. As of this writing, the case is 
pending. See Hodulik, Prohibiting Discriminatory Harassment By Regulating Student SPeech: A 
Balancing of First-Amendment and University Interests, 16 lC. U.L. 573 (1990) (description of the 
University of Wisconsin's attempts to draft its anti-harassment disciplinary policy). 
18 Revised Policy, supra note 11, gives the following as an example of a violation of the 
policy: "before an exam, a white student uses a racial epithet to [an African-American] 
student and tells her to go home and stop using a white person's space." Id. at 2. Since the 
exchange affected the student's performance on an exam and was not part of a classroom 
discussion, this would violate the policy. On the other hand, a comment made during a 
classroom discussion, which was not intended to injure an individual student, such as the 
Holocaust "was a good thing because it destroyed members of an inferior religion" or that 
"the average size of the craniums of each race is related to the average intelligence of that 
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Although commendable with respect to protecting the rights 
of its students of nondominant groups, college administrators' ef-
forts to curtail hurtful speech may conflict with other students' 
rights to express themselves freely under the first amendment to 
the United States Constitution. 19 Administrators must balance the 
extent to which targeted groups are entitled to a harassment-free 
campus environment against the free speech rights of the verbal 
attackers. This conflict has provoked battles on many university 
campuses.20 Conservatives have joined with the American Civil Lib-
erties Union, the former to combat what they feel to be "minority 
assertiveness" on campus, the latter to protect an absolute right of 
free expression.21 Recently, this conflict has reached the courts.22 In 
September 1989, a Michigan federal district court held that the 
University of Michigan's disciplinary policy as originally drafted 
violated the first amendment. 23 Soon thereafter, the University's 
race," is protected under the policy. Id. The University of Wisconsin policy, supra note 17, 
states the following examples: 
1. A student would be in violation if: 
a. He or she intentionally made demeaning remarks to an individual based on 
that person's ethnicity, such as name calling, racial slurs, or '1okes;" and 
b. His or her purpose in uttering the remarks was to make the educational 
environment hostile for the person to whom the demeaning remark was addressed. 
2. A student would be in violation if: 
a. He or she intentionally placed visual or written material demeaning the race 
or sex of an individual in that person's university living quarters or work area; and 
b. His or her purpose was to make the educational environment hostile for the 
person in whose quarters or work area the material was placed. 
3. A student would be in violation if he or she seriously damaged or destroyed 
private property of any member of the university community or guest because of 
that person's race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, national 
origin, ancestry or age. 
4. A student would not be in violation if, during a class discussion, he or she 
expressed a derogatory opinion concerning a racial or ethnic group. There is no 
violation, since the student's remark was addressed to the class as a whole, not to a 
specific individual. Moreover, on the facts as stated, there seems no evidence that 
the student's purpose was to create a hostile environment. 
Id. at 66. 
19 The first amendment states in part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the 
freedom of speech." U.s. CONST. amend. I. The Court extended the first amendment's 
prohibitions to the states through the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Gitlow v. 
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
20 Bernstein, On Campus, How Free Should Free Speech Be?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1989, 
§ E, at 5, col. 1. 
21 Id. 
22 See Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). 
23 [d. at 864, 867. 
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Board of Regents responded by rewriting its policy to comply with 
the court's decision.24 
This Note will analyze the constitutionality of anti-harassment 
disciplinary policies at public universities. 25 Part II will analyze 
speech exempt from university regulation-that is, constitutionally 
protected speech-by discussing content neutrality, offensive 
speech, and heightened protection of expression in an academic 
setting. Part III will discuss the narrow exceptions to the first 
amendment in which universities may have some regulatory power. 
These include: "fighting words," intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, group libel, and incitement to imminent lawless action. Part 
IV will analyze how universities must draft policies to avoid claims 
of overbreadth and vagueness. In Part V, this Note will attempt to 
reconcile the freedom of equality for all citizens guaranteed by the 
fourteenth amendment with the freedom of expression guaranteed 
by the first amendment. This part will consider recent commentary 
arguing for the inclusion of the victims' perspective in the balancing 
of the first and fourteenth amendments. The purpose of this Note 
is to provide some guidance to university officials who wish to 
counter hurtful speech by drafting a constitutionally permissible 
anti-harassment policy. 
II. PROTECTED FREE SPEECH 
A. Philosophical Background 
Philosophers of first amendment jurisprudence have justified 
our society'S dedication to unregulated freedom of expression in 
marlY ways.26 Philosopher John Stuart Mill emphasized the impor-
24 Cole Interview, supra note 15. Ms. Cole stated that the Revised Policy was rewritten 
and adopted in September 1989. 
25 This Note will focus on curtailment of speech solely at public universities. Because of 
the "state action doctrine," the first amendment does not apply to private"universities, even 
though most follow the tenets of the first amendment for philosophical or, if mentioned in 
the college catalogue, for contractual reasons. Harvard Lecture, supra note 1, comments by 
Professor Randall Kennedy, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. State constitutions, as 
opposed to the u.s. Constitution, may apply to private institutions. Law and Policy Implications 
for Private Institutions, 1 SYNTHESIS: L. & POL'y IN HIGHER EDuc. 4 (1989). William Kaplin, 
Professor of Law at The Catholic University of America, stated in an interview regarding 
the 'state action test: "There must be a direct connection between the activity of government 
and the particular decision that the institution made. It's not enough that the government 
provides some monetary support." Id. 
26 Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878-86 
(1963). 
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tance of free speech as a search for truth in society.27 Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes adopted this philosophy in his dissent in Abrams v. 
United States, in which he stated: "[T]he best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market .... "28 Although truth will not always emerge from full 
discussion, believers in this rationale claim that free debate will more 
often lead to the truth than if the government or another group 
determines which ideas are valid.29 It follows that the government 
must remain "neutral" in this marketplace of ideas.30 A second 
rationale supporting freedom of expression is self-governance, the 
notion that government must allow members of society to express 
their opinions so that they can consent to be governed.31 In a 
democracy, "even the most odious ideas must be afforded consti-
tutional protection if the society is to retain its essential characteristic 
of popular self-governance."32 A third rationale is that unfettered 
speech leads to self-fulfillment, the development of one's own char-
acter in society.33 The basic assumption behind self-fulfillment is 
that every individual has the right to develop her own character in 
society by first forming her own opinions, then expressing them. 34 
A fourth rationale is that freedom of expression in an open society 
promotes flexibility in the government in that it maintains a "balance 
between stability and change."35 A society based on suppressed 
speech would stagnate because of its inflexibility.36 Free discussion 
provides the moving force behind social change, ensuring that so-
ciety progresses. 37 These traditional justifications for free expres-
27 ]. MILL, ON LIBERTY 50 (E. Rappaport 1978). 
28 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,]., dissenting). 
29 Letter from Derek Bok, President of Harvard University, to the Harvard Community 
2 (Sept. 21, 1984) (Reflections on Free Speech: An Open Letter to the Harvard Community) 
[hereinafter Bok Letter]. 
30 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978). 
31 Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255; see also 
Emerson, supra note 26, at 883; Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, 
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 178 (1982); Police Dep't of Chicago 
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972). 
32 Card, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 531, 547-48 (1980). 
33 Emerson, supra note 26, at 879-80; Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a 
Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974). 
34 Emerson, supra note 26, at 879. 
35 Id. at 884. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. Emerson argues that the outcome of prohibiting free speech in this instance would 
be increased rigidity in our society: "[a]ttitudes and ideas become stereotyped; institutions 
lose their vitality." Id. His reasoning is ironic in this context. If we as a society permit full 
expression without restraint for all racial, sexist, and homosexual remarks, we may reinforce 
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sion-the marketplace of ideas, self-governance, self-fulfillment, 
and change-represent an underlying idealistic vision of a tolerant 
society from which a "rational and enlightened civilization" will 
emerge.38 
From this philosophical backdrop, certain legal theories have 
evolved. The first, commonly referred to as "content neutrality," 
maintains that the government cannot pass laws banning speech 
because of its content.39 Under the second theory, the United States 
Supreme Court has guaranteed first amendment protection to of-
fensive speech.40 The third is the Court's heightened commitment 
to first amendment principles in the academic community.4! Uni-
versities must keep in mind these three legal theories of the first 
amendment when enacting anti-harassment disciplinary policies.42 
The next section will discuss each of these theories in turn: content 
neutrality, offensive speech, and academic setting. 
B. Legal Theories 
1. Content Neutrality 
The Supreme Court has held that the government cannot re-
strict individual expression because of its message, ideas, subject 
matter, or content.43 In so holding, the Court has affirmed our 
country's commitment to uninhibited debate guaranteed by the first 
amendment.44 Operating under the premise that no idea is false,45 
stereotyped ideas and attitudes. Additionally, if universities lose some of their diversity 
because of hurtful speech, they also lose some of their vitality. 
38 Id. at 886. 
39 Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
40 Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969). The Court did not uphold the New 
York criminal conviction of appellant for his contemptuous words against the American flag. 
/d. at 594. See also Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989). The Court struck down the 
criminal conviction of a flag burner. 
41 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (Arkansas statute requiring teachers to 
list affiliations as a condition of employment held invalid). 
42 Sedler Comments, supra note 11; Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction at 11 [hereinafter Sedler Brief], Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 
(E.D. Mich. 1989) (No. 89-CV-71683-DT). 
43 Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 
U.S. 15, 24 (1971). 
44 Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24-25. 
45 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). 
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courts prohibit governmental regulation of "hate speech."46 With 
any content-based regulation, the Court will strictly scrutinize the 
state's interest in restricting expression.47 
In enacting anti-harassment policies, some universities limit 
speech by distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable content of 
expression.48 In effect, they dictate an "orthodoxy" for their stu-
dents, determining that speech against another's race, gender, sex-
uality, national origin, or religion does not necessitate first amend-
ment protection.49 The United States Supreme Court would most 
likely classify university policies that promote a certain orthodoxy 
as cQiltent-based restrictions. 50 In trying to protect the rights of 
minority students with disciplinary policies, university officials risk 
unlawfully curtailing speech, the content of which is antithetical to 
campus harmony. 
There is a danger in imposing such restrictions on speech 
because the policies extend beyond the scope of protecting certain 
students. Additionally, imposing restrictions on speech in this man-
ner risks stifling all students, not just those whose views are repug-
nant to the university. As Chester Finn, Jr., former United States 
Assistant Secretary of Education, stated: "[n]or do the narrowing 
limits on free expression lead only to penalties for individuals who 
engage in 'biased' talk or 'hostile' behavior. They also leave little 
room for opinion that deviates from campus political norms or for 
grievances from unexpected directions."51 As these policies may 
restrict students' rights to expression based on the content of their 
message, courts would subject the university's interest in preserving 
campus harmony to the "most exacting scrutiny."52 
46 See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1203 (7th Cir. 1978). The court held that Skokie, 
Illinois, ordinances prohibiting members of the Nazi party from invoking racial and religious 
hatred by marching in a predominantly Jewish neighborhood were unconstitutional. See also 
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26. 
47 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). 
48 See Initial and Revised Policies, supra note 15; see also supra note 18 for examples of 
acceptable and unacceptable behavior at the University of Michigan and the University of 
Wisconsin. 
49 Sedler Brief, supra note 42, at 15. 
50 See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there 
is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion 
.... "). 
51 Finn, The Campus: "An Island of Repression in a Sea of Freedom", COMMENTARY, Sept. 
1989, at 21. 
52 Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2543 (1989) (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 
321 (1988)). In applying this test, as in the fourteenth amendment equal protection strict 
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2. Offensive Speech 
Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that the government 
cannot prohibit offensive expression merely because it is offensive. 53 
In fact, the Court has advocated more speech, not less, to combat 
offensive speech. 54 In Cohen v. California,55 the Court held that 
offensive, profane language was protected free speech.56 The Court 
reasoned that although the expletive "Fuck the Draft" written on 
the defendant's jacket was "distasteful," the government could not 
regulate his taste and styleY Rather than a government-imposed 
standard, this determination should be left to the individua1.58 The 
Court reasoned that the government cannot suppress certain words 
it considers offensive without the risk of suppressing ideas protected 
by the first amendment at the same time.59 The Court reaffirmed 
this proposition in its recent first amendment decision, Texas v. 
Johnson. 60 The decision states: "[i]f there is a bedrock principle 
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may 
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds 
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."61 
In light of this premise, university disciplinary policies would 
be unconstitutional if they attempted to legislate against speech 
scrutiny standard, the Supreme Court would uphold a statute only where there was a 
compelling government interest and when the statute is drafted narrowly to achieve that 
interest. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981) (state's interest in maintaining sepa-
ration of church and state on a public university campus not sufficiently compelling to justify 
content-based restriction on speech). 
53 See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 
422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975). 
54 F. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 94 (1981). In New York Times 
Company v. Sullivan, the Court stated, "we consider this case against the background of a 
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open .... " 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
55 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
56 Id. at 24-25. 
57 Id. at 16, 25. 
58 Id. at 25. 
59 Id. at 26. 
60 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2544 (1989). 
61 Id. But cf FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In Pacifica, the Court allowed 
the FCC to regulate an indecent, offensive radio broadcast. While upholding the offensiveness 
standard, stating that the government must remain neutral in the "marketplace of ideas," 
the Court compared this speech to obscenity and reasoned that it is "not entirely outside the 
protection of the First Amendment." Id. at 745-46. The Court reasoned that protection 
under the first amendment varies as to the context (as opposed to content) of speech, id. at 
748-49; in Pacifica, the broadcast occurred on a Tuesday afternoon when children may easily 
have listened to the broadcast, id. at 749-50. 
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simply because it was offensive. As the Court noted in Papish v. 
Board of Curators,62 "the mere dissemination of ideas-no matter 
how offensive to good taste-on a state university campus may not 
be shut off in the name alone of 'conventions of decency."'63 Al-
though epithets against other students are offensive, a proposition 
with which most of society would agree, refusing to suppress offen-
sive speech is a "central test" of our commitment to free speech.64 
Even if the Court allowed the prohibition of certain speech on 
campus, it is uncertain in whom the university would entrust the 
censoring power.65 The possible censoring bodies-administration, 
faculty, or students-are unsatisfactory in light of the constitutional 
issues at stake. With the enactment of anti-harassment policies on 
college campuses, and the ensuing litigation they provoke, judges 
will most likely playa more active role in determining which speech 
universities may prohibit. Judges, however, are also unsatisfactory 
censors. As Dean Lee Bollinger wrote: 'judges, being human, will 
not only make mistakes but will sometimes succumb to the pressures 
exerted by the government to allow restraints [on speech] that ought 
not to be allowed. To guard against these possibilities we must give 
judges as little room to maneuver as possible .... "66 
3. Heightened Protection of Expression in the Academic 
Atmosphere 
The heightened protection of expression in the academic set-
ting follows from the special nature of universities. Thomas Jeffer-
son stated with respect to the concept of the university: "[Here] we 
are not afraid to follow truth, wherever it may lead, nor to tolerate 
62 410 u.s. 667 (1973) (because political cartoon depicting policeman raping the Statue 
of Liberty was not constitutionally obscene, public university officials could not expel its 
distributor). 
63 [d. at 670. Since this was decided prior to Justice Rehnquist's elevation to Chief Justice, 
it may be useful to include his views on this subject. In dissent, Rehnquist argued that 
governing officials at a public university have more authority to control the school's environ-
ment, in this case by suppressing the allegedly obscene newpapers, even if the first amend-
ment would bar the state's authority to punish the distributor criminally. [d. at 677 (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting). 
64 Barringer, Campus Battle Pits Freedom of Speech Against Racial Slurs, N.Y. Times, Apr. 
25, 1989, § A, at 1, col. 1. The article discusses a letter from G. Gunther, Professor of 
Constitutional Law, Stanford Law School, in opposition to proposed anti-harassment policy 
at Stanford University. 
65 Bok Letter, supra note 29, at 2. 
66 L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 78 (1986). Professor Bollinger is a Dean and 
Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School. 
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error so long as reason is left free to combat it. "67 This theoretical 
belief in open discourse remains true in the modern university as 
well. Harvard University President Derek Bok explains that univer-
sities must allow expression to flourish in order to uphold their 
mISSIon: 
Universities have a special interest in upholding free speech. 
Educational institutions exist to further the search for truth and 
understanding and to encourage the personal development of 
all who study and work within their walls. Because the right to 
speak freely and the opportunity to enjoy an open forum for 
debate are so closely related to these central purposes, the uni-
versity has a stake in free speech that goes beyond the interest 
of its members. Its integrity as an institution is bound up in the 
maintenance of this freedom, and each denial of the right to 
speak diminishes the university itself in some measure.68 
The Court has specifically affirmed this commitment to free 
speech inherent in our education system.69 In Shelton v. Tucker,7° 
the Court noted that "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional 
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American 
schools."7l Although it is important that school administrators have 
the right to control conduct in public schools,72 the Court has also 
recognized that the administrators must abide by the first amend-
ment, as its protections apply in that setting.73 When applying first 
amendment rights, the government must consider the special cir-
cumstances of the environment involved in the case.74 In the public 
university environment, the Court has recognized the importance 
of "safeguarding academic freedom" for the "marketplace of ideas" 
found in the university classroom and community.75 
67 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 196 (1861), quoted in Goldman, The University 
and the Liberty of its Students-A Fiduciary Theory, 54 Ky. L.J. 643, 646 (1966). 
68 Bok Letter, supra note 29, at 2. 
69 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); see Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community 
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (students and teachers should not have to "shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate"). 
70 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
71 364 U.S. at 487. 
72 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507. 
" Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1981); Healy, 408 U.S. at 180; Tinker, 393 
U.S. at 506-07; Shelton, 364 U.S. at 487; see also Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 
VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1037 (1969). 
74 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
75 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). But see Papish v. Board of 
Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 677 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), supra note 63; Healy, 408 U.S. 
at 203 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (Rehnquist makes the distinction between the role of 
government as a college administrator and as a promulgator of criminal statutes: "The 
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Thus, the Court will not allow laws that "cast a pall of orthodoxy 
over the classroom" by violating the first amendment. 76 Some com-
mentators go further and argue that the anti-harassment policies 
adopted by some universities attempt to promote an orthodox ide-
ology, which will not tolerate homophobic, racist, sexist, or anti-
Semitic speech. 77 Thus, they perceive the policies to be in violation 
of both the first amendment and the mission of an academic insti-
tution.78 Policies which may have a "chilling effect" on free speech 
are antithetical to this pursuit of truth through unfettered speech. 
III. EXCEPTIONS TO FREE SPEECH 
A. Background 
As discussed above, there exists a strong presumption in favor 
of free speech. The Supreme Court has stated, however, that free 
speech is not absolute. 79 The Court has carved out a few narrow 
exceptions to which the first amendment does not apply.80 In so 
doing, the Court has allowed the government to regulate speech 
that falls within these unprotected exceptions.8l There are three 
exceptions that are pertinent in the regulation of speech on the 
public university campus: so-called "fighting words," group libel, 
and speech which incites imminent lawless action.82 The following 
government as ... school administrator may impose upon ... students reasonable regulations 
that would be impermissible if imposed by the government upon all citizens."). 
76 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603. 
77 Kors, It's SPeech, Not Sex, the Dean Bans Now, Wall St. j., Oct. 12, 1989, at A16, col. 3. 
The enactment of policies that favor the ideological agenda of the "victims" in society, 
guaranteeing them a community free from sexism, racism and homophobia, chills the speech 
of anyone who might offend such groups. Id. See generally Finn, supra note 51. 
78 Kors, supra note 77; see also Cultural Revolutions, supra note 2; Goldman, supra note 
67, at 643 ("it is in the area of student expression and association that the university's 
disciplinary power poses its greatest potential threat to society, to the university itself and 
possibly to the individual student"). 
79 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). In Schenck, the Court affirmed 
appellants' conspiracy conviction for distributing leaflets against military recruiting. Although 
ordinarily the leaflets would have been protected by the first amendment, the Court ruled 
that the wartime leaflets posed a national security risk. Id. 
80 In addition to the exceptions discussed in this section, these include: obscenity, Roth 
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), and commercial speech, Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 
1 (1979). 
81 Roth, 354 U.S. at 485; Friedman, 440 U.S. at 9. 
82 In addition to relying on punitive sanctions from such university policies, victimized 
students may also attempt to collect civil damages from a perpetrator based on the common 
law action of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Such a remedy is beyond the scope 
of this Note. See generally Delgado, supra note 31; Note, First Amendment Limits on Tort Liability 
for Words Intended to Inflict Severe Emotional Distress, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1749 (1985). 
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discussion will apply each exception to the power of the university 
to regulate speech. 
B. Fighting Words 
The Court developed the "fighting words" doctrine in Chaplin-
sky v. New Hampshire. 83 The Court defined "fighting words" as those 
words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite 
an immediate breach of the peace."84 In Chaplinsky, a police officer 
arrested the defendant for breach of the peace after the defendant 
had called the city marshall a "[g]od damned racketeer" and a 
"damned [fJascist."85 The Court held that such words are beyond 
the protections of the first amendment's right to free speech because 
they do not promote "any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight 
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality."86 Because such words are not communication, but "in-
struments of assault," they are not entitled to first amendment 
protection.87 Since the first amendment does not apply to "fighting 
words," it follows that the government can regulate them with nar-
rowly drawn statutes.88 The Court in Chaplinsky upheld defendant's 
conviction based on this "fighting words" exception and the nar-
rowly drawn New Hampshire statute.89 
Although the Court has continued to recognize the "fighting 
words" doctrine as a valid exception, the Court has narrowly con-
strued it. 90 In some subsequent cases, it has declined to classify the 
challenged speech as "fighting words."91 In Cohen v. California, the 
83 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
84 Id. at 572. 
85 Id. at 569. 
86 Id. at 572. 
87 Shea, "Don't Bother to Smile When You Call Me That"-Fighting Words and the First 
Amendment, 63 Ky. L.J. 1,22 (1975). 
88 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573. 
89 Id. 
90 Punishing Racist Speech, I SYNTHESIS: L. & POL'y IN HIGHER EDUC. 3 (1989) [hereinafter 
Racist SPeech]; see also NOWAK, ROTUNDA, AND YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 944 (3d ed. 1986) 
[hereinafter NOWAK]. 
91 Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (flag statute making it a misdemeanor 
to cast contempt by words or acts on the American flag held unconstitutional because, even 
though inflammatory, these words would not rise to the level of fighting words); Bachellar 
v. Maryland, 397 U.s. 564,567 (1970) (anti-Vietnam War demonstration in front of an Army 
recruiting station, which involved inflammatory posters and an exchange between demon-
strators and the public, did not rise to the level of "fighting words"); Cohen v. California, 
403 U.S. 15,20 (1971). 
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Court refused to apply the "fighting words" doctrine to an epithet 
written on defendant's jacket.92 At the same time, the Court further 
refined its definition of "fighting words."93 In Cohen, the Court 
reasoned that the words "Fuck the Draft" were not "fighting words" 
because no individual "could reasonably have regarded the words 
on appellant's jacket as a direct personal insult."94 Additionally, the 
state failed to show that defendant intended to provoke an imme-
diate, violent breach of the peace.95 
Thus, in order to justify a curtailment of free speech under 
the "fighting words" doctrine, it seems that the speaker must fall 
within the Chaplinsky definition of "fighting words," narrowed by 
Cohen "to face to face encounters in which unusually provocative 
words have a direct tendency to provoke an immediate act of vio-
lence by a person to whom, individually, the words are addressed."96 
When the listener could have simply avoided eye contact, the Court 
will not invoke the "fighting words" doctrine.97 
In other subsequent cases, where the "fighting words" doctrine 
was arguably applicable, the Court has avoided the issue by over-
turning defendants' convictions based on the statutes' overbreadth 
rather than for failure to meet the "fighting words" standard.98 
Some critics argue that the "fighting words" doctrine is dead as the 
Court has not upheld a conviction for the use of such words since 
Chaplinsky.99 Although the Court has continued to reaffirm the 
"fighting words" doctrine,lOo it has chosen not to apply the doctrine 
92 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20. 
93 [d. 
94 [d. (emphasis added). 
95 [d. 
96 Racist Speech, supra note 90. at 3; Gard, supra note 32, at 572-73. 
97 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21. 
98 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). In Terminiello, the Court reversed the 
conviction of a suspended Catholic priest, arrested for yelling at his adversaries, due to the 
overbreadth of the city breach of peace ordinance. The ordinance read in part: "All persons 
who shall make, aid, countenance, or assist in making any improper noise, riot, disturbance, 
breach of the peace, or diversion tending to a breach of the peace, ... shall be deemed guilty 
of disorderly conduct .... " § 1(1), ch. 193, Rev. Code 1939, City of Chicago, quoted in 
Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 2 n.l. In Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), the Court overturned 
the convictions of a verbally abusive anti-Vietnam War protestor because of an overbroad 
statute. The statute read in part: "Any person who shall, without provocation, use to or of 
another, and in his presence ... opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a 
breach of the peace ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6303, quoted 
in Gooding, 405 U.S. at 518-19. See also Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974). 
99 See Gard, supra note 32, at 535; Gooding, 405 U.S. at 537 (Blackmun, j., dissenting) 
(,,(T]he Court ... is merely paying lip service to Chaplinsky."). 
toO See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2542 (1989). 
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in situations analogous to Chaplinsky.lol In fact, the Court has only 
invoked the doctrine once, to uphold the ChapLinsky conviction. 
Since that time, the Court has narrowed the doctrine and voided 
the applicable statutes for overbreadth.102 The Court's reluctance 
to apply the doctrine implies that this exception does not hold much 
weight. 
Thus, disciplinary policies which carve out narrowly defined 
"fighting words" exceptions probably are constitutional; however, 
courts will be reluctant to validate policies unless they follow the 
narrow definition of Cohen discussed above. Words that merely 
anger, without immediately provoking violence in a direct personal 
encounter, would not be punishable. 103 Even though narrowly 
drafted provisions prohibiting "fighting words" on campus would 
be constitutional, it seems likely that the Court would rule only on 
a challenged policy's overbreadth. Thus, in developing an anti-
harassment policy, universities should not rely heavily on the Chap-
Linsky rationale of fighting words. 104 
A caveat should be added. Despite the fact that the Supreme 
Court interprets the "fighting words" doctrine narrowly, requiring 
that the words provoke an immediate act of violence in the lis-
tener,105 some state courts have applied the "fighting words" doc-
trine in a broader manner.106 Most of these state cases that rely on 
a broad interpretation involved convictions for verbal epithets 
against a police officer. 107 As a person trained to encounter such 
speech, a police officer would most likely not react in a violent 
manner. !Os By allowing regulation of such words, these state courts 
101 Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 
567 (1970); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 20; Norwell v. City of Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 14, 
16 (1973). 
102 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
103 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20. 
104 Racist Speech, supra note 90, at 3. 
105 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20. 
106 In the dissenting opinion of Karlan v. City of Cincinnati, 416 U.S. 924, 928 (1974) 
(Douglas, j., dissenting), Justice Douglas noted that state courts have failed to apply the 
overbreadth analysis to statutes in "fighting words" cases: "state courts ... have consistently 
shown either inability or unwillingness to apply its teaching." Id. 
107 See, e.g., Bousquet v. State, 261 Ark. 263, 548 S.W.2d 125 (1977); Bolden v. State, 
148 Ga. App. 315, 251 S.E.2d 165 (1978); Johnson v. State, 143 Ga. App. 826, 240 S.E.2d 
207 (1977); State v. Boss, 195 Neb. 467, 238 N.W.2d 639 (1976). 
108 Shea, supra note 87, at 22. Professor Shea writes: "a legless cripple, a feeble old 
woman and a dedicated police officer are fair game for the vilest personal verbal abuse 
because they are ... unlikely to retaliate physically." Id. Contrary to the broad interpretation 
of some states, the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation would not classify such words as 
"fighting words" in the above-mentioned situations. Id. 
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have invoked the "fighting words" doctrine more often than Su-
preme Court precedents would indicate. 109 University administra-
tors, however, should not rely on this generous and factually specific 
interpretation of the exception, which might allow them to regulate 
speech more liberally, as the Court has the authority to ensure that 
state acts comport with the United States Constitution. llo 
C. Group Libel Laws 
The Court determined in Beauharnais v. Illinois lll that the first 
amendment does not protect group libel-statements that defame 
designated groups.ll2 In Beauharnais, the police arrested a White 
Circle League president for distributing a racist leaflet. 113 The Illi-
nois statute under which the defendant was convicted declared 
illegal any publication which "portrays depravity, criminality, un-
chastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, 
creed or religion .... "ll4 The Court extended the reach of individ-
uallibel to libelous utterances directed at a group. Reasoning that 
such libelous activity fell outside of first amendment protections, 
the Court upheld the statute as constitutional. ll5 Although Beau-
harnais has never been overruled, the Court implicitly limited the 
doctrine in New York Times Company v. Sullivan. ll6 That case re-
stricted state law claims for libel and slander by public officials 
against the press. 117 The Court reasoned that the freedoms embod-
109 Gard, supra note 32, at 564. 
110 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 342 (1816). 
III 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
112 Id. at 251,266-67. 
113 Id. at 252. 
114 Id. at 251. Other states and some foreign countries have enacted similar group libel 
laws. Lasson, Racial Defamation as Free Speech: Abusing the First Amendment, 17 COLUM. HUM. 
RTs. L. REV. 11, 30, 50-53 (1985); HAIMAN, supra note 54, at 89-90. These include Con-
necticut, Massachusetts, Montana, and Nevada. Lasson, supra, at 30 n. 131. Denmark, Sweden, 
and England (Race Relations Act, 1965) have enacted limitations on group libel as well. Id. 
at 50-53; HAIMAN, supra note 54, at 90. Haiman notes, however, that the statute in England 
has not made the country "any freer of racial conflict in the streets than has the United 
States." HAIMAN, supra note 54, at 94. 
115 Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 266-67. 
116 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also NOWAK, supra note 90, 
which states, "Although Beauharnais v. Illinois has never been explicitly rejected, it should not 
represent present law in light of New York Times v. Sullivan." Id. at 926. In addition, other 
courts have questioned the constitutional validity of Beauharnais in light of recent case law. 
See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir. 1978). 
117 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 283. 
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ied in the first amendment necessitated such restrictions. liS Because 
it appears that broad statutes aimed at criminalizing group defa-
mation are probably not constitutional after New York Times,Jlg uni-
versity officials should not rely on the holding in Beauharnais when 
drafting an anti-harassment policy.120 Thus, policies which prohibit 
group libel, specifically the distribution of racist or anti-Semitic 
publications, would most likely not be valid. 
D. Inciting Imminent Lawless Action 
Another exception to the constitutional principles of unfettered 
free expression is speech that causes imminent lawless action. 121 In 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 122 the Supreme Court held that it would permit 
government regulation of expression when the expression reaches 
the level of "inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is 
likely to incite or produce such action."123 In Brandenburg, the Court 
distinguished between "mere advocacy," which the government can-
not punish, and inciting a group to violence, which the government 
can permissibly regulate. 124 
The Brandenburg case involved an Ohio statute criminalizing 
conduct that encouraged the commission of violence to accomplish 
political reform. 125 State officials charged the defendant, a Ku Klux 
Klan leader, with violating the statute. 126 He was later convicted. 127 
On appeal, the Court struck down the statute, reasoning that it 
impermissibly swept within its regulatory power "the mere abstract 
teaching" of violent political upheaval. I2S The Court reasoned that 
a statute which "sweeps within its condemnation speech which our 
Constitution has immunized from governmental control" is uncon-
118 Id. at 269. As the Court noted, "libel can claim no talismanic iinmunity from consti-
tutionallimitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment." Id. 
119 See NOWAK, supra note 90, at 926. 
120 Racist Speech, supra note 90, at 3. But see Lasson, supra note 114, at 32-37 (espousing 
the constitutionality of a properly drafted group defamation statute because, in part, 1) the 
Court has never specifically overruled Beauharnais and 2) racial defamation is non-speech). 
121 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 u.s. 444, 447-48 (1969). 
122 Id. at 444. 
123 Id. at 447. 
124 Id. at 448-49. 
125 Id. at 444. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. At a Klan rally, defendant discussed the group's plan to march on Congress. He 
also allegedly made a number of racist and anti-Semitic statements. Id. at 445-46. 
128 Id. at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)). 
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stitutional. I29 Thus, by mandating that legislatures draft narrow 
statutes to prohibit only that expression that incites imminent law-
less action, Brandenburg provided broad protection for free expres-
sion. 130 
After Brandenburg, the Court has strictly interpreted this stan-
dard, requiring a "careful consideration" of the facts and circum-
stances surrounding such expression. 131 In Hess v. Indiana,132 the 
police arrested the defendant, an anti-war demonstrator, for dis-
orderly conduct for shouting "[ w ]e'll take the fucking street later 
[or again]" after police officers had cleared demonstrators off a 
street. 133 The Court held that because "at worst, [defendant's 
speech] amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action 
at some indefinite future time," the defendant's expression did not 
incite imminent action. 134 Moreover, as defendant did not direct his 
statement to any specific persons in the crowd, the Court reasoned 
that he was not even advocating action. 135 
In order to protect against student expression advocating vio-
lence against women, homosexuals, or minorities, universities would 
have to tailor their policies narrowly to guard against only immi-
nent, lawless incitement to action. Given that the Court has carefully 
protected speech in its application of the standard, drafting a con-
stitutionally permissible policy would be difficult. Even so, unless 
policy drafters incorporated the Brandenburg language into the pol-
icy, a court would likely rule that the regulation was too broad. 
In summary, as a general rule, the government cannot regulate 
speech because of its content or because it is offensive. 136 If speech 
falls into one of the exceptions to this rule, however, the government 
may regulate it. 137 The government may regulate speech where it 
constitutes "fighting words"138 or where it incites the listener to 
imminent action. 139 On the other hand, the Supreme Court would 
most likely find regulation of group libel unconstitutional. l4o 
129 [d. 
130 See NOWAK, supra note 90, at 864. 
131 Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2542 (1989). 
132414U.S.105(1973). 
133 [d. at 107 (last words of defendant's statement were unclear at trial). 
134 [d. at 108. 
135 [d. at 108-09. 
136 Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
137 See supra notes 80 and 81 and accompanying text. 
138 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,20 (1971). 
139 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969). 
140 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
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IV. SCOPE OF ANTI-HARASSMENT POLICIES 
A. Overbreadth 
Even though the government may constitutionally prohibit 
speech in the exceptions mentioned above, it may only regulate with 
"narrow specificity." 141 When a regulation not only affects the 
regulable exceptions to free speech but also the constitutionally 
protected speech, with no provision for severing the latter uncon-
stitutional application, it is overbroad and void in its entirety.142 By 
prohibiting overbroad statutes, the Court protects against the "chill-
ing effect" on speech that such statutes would likely cause. 143 Be-
cause allegedly overbroad statutes may encroach on the first amend-
ment, the Court does not hesitate "to take into account possible 
applications of the statute in other factual contexts besides that at 
bar" when reviewing a statute. 144 The Court has adopted a strict 
evaluative standard by placing the burden on the government to 
"show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state 
interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."145 
In September 1989, the Federal District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan applied this standard to the University of Mich-
igan's initial anti-harassment policy in Doe v. Michigan. 146 The plain-
tiff in Doe, a biopsychology graduate student studying the individual 
differences in personality traits and mental abilities, feared sanc-
tions by the university because of classroom discussions about race 
and gender differences. 147 He claimed that the policy impinged 
upon his first amendment right to discuss these controversial the-
ories freely.148 He asserted that the policy was unconstitutional due 
141 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). 
142 See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940) (statute prohibiting all types of 
picketing, peaceful or otherwise, was void due to overbreadth); cf Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 
413 U.S. 601, 615-16 (1973) (Court limited the overbreadth test by stating that overbreadth 
of a statute must be substantial in order for it to be unconstitutional; however, the Court 
seems to apply this limitation to statutes involving only conduct, not mere speech). 
143 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967). 
144 NAACP, 371 U.S. at 432. 
145 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981); see also NAACP, 371 U.S. at 433. This 
language is also used in fourteenth amendment equal protection analysis. See NOWAK, supra 
note 90, at 530. 
146 See Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852,864-66 (E.D. Mich. 1989). For a 
discussion of the Initial Policy, see supra notes 15-16. 
147 Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 858. 
148 [d. 
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to its overbreadth and vagueness. 149 The court agreed that the initial 
policy was overbroad, reasoning that the university had prohibited 
both unprotected and a "substantial amount of constitutionally pro-
tected" expression. 150 
The court cited three examples of the university using the 
policy to regulate speech that should have been protected by the 
first amendment. 151 First, in a social work class discussion, a grad-
uate student had several "heated discussions" with his classmates in 
defending his belief that homosexuality was a disease. 152 The hear-
ing panel charged the student with sexual harassment, but acquitted 
him on a sexual orientation harassment claim. 153 The court pointed 
out, however, that the panel did not claim any first amendment 
violation on the part of the university in "forcing the student to a 
hearing to answer for allegedly harassing statements made in the 
course of academic discussion and research."154 A second case in-
volved the informal sanctioning of a business school student who, 
in an in-class public speaking exercise, recited a limerick that 
mocked an athlete for his alleged homosexuality.155 After a series 
of formal apologies, first to the class and then in the school news-
paper, and the speaker's attendance at an educational forum on 
homosexuality, the complaint was dropped. 156 A third incident in-
volved an in-class statement by a dentistry student, who commented 
that "he had heard that minorities had a difficult time in the course 
and that he had heard that they were not treated fairly."157 In 
response to a complaint lodged by the professor of the class, the 
student had to attend counseling sessions and apologize formally.15s 
Such incidents illustrate that the university policy covered classroom 
discussions which are clearly within the protected realm of free 
speech. 159 Moreover, they show that the university did not even 
require an analysis of the first amendment considerations of each 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 864. 
151 Id. at 865-66. 
152 Id. at 865. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 866 (quoting Complaint No. 88-9-07). 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 865. 
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complaint before giving notice to the accused that a complaint was 
filed. 160 
Thus, in drafting a policy, a university can only legislate against 
unprotected speech. A university cannot draft a far-reaching policy 
that affects speech protected by the first amendment. Additionally, 
the policy must establish a method of reviewing complaints for 
constitutionality, perhaps by a mandatory review by university coun-
sel, before sending notice of the complaint to the alleged perpetra-
tor. 
B. Vagueness 
The Court has also held that vague statutes, like those that are 
overbroad, are void. 161 The Court will void a statute for vagueness 
if "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its mean-
ing."162 The Court has held that legislators must draft statutes in 
such a way that the "ordinary person exercising ordinary common 
sense can sufficiently understand and comply .... "163 Because these 
definitions of vagueness are themselves unclear, the Court has at-
tempted to clarify this concept. In Grayned v. City of R ockford 164 and 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma,165 the Court held that legislators must draft 
statutes so that potential violators will understand which are pro-
hibited activities and so that public officials will have explicit stan-
dards to follow. 166 This is particularly true when the challenged 
regulation "is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the [fJirst 
[a]mendment."167 According to Professor Laurence Tribe, however, 
the Court is unlikely to find a statute void for vagueness unless "the 
individual challenging the statute is indeed one of the entrapped 
innocent, and that it would have been practical for the legislature 
to draft more precisely." 168 
1611 ld. at 866. 
lui Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
Ifi" ld. 
16:] United States Civil Servo Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 
U.S. 548, 579 (1973). 
164 408 U.S. 104 (1972). 
165 413 U.S. 601 (1973). 
166 See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09 (1972); Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 607 (1973). 
167 Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974). 
IG8 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-31, at 1034 (2d ed. 1988) (footnotes 
omitted); see United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1,7 (1947); see generally, Note, The Void-for-
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960). 
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In Doe, in addition to finding the University of Michigan policy 
overbroad, the district court ruled that enforcement of the policy 
would violate the due process clause because its terms were so 
vague. 169 The policy was not limited in its scope nor did it distin-
guish between regulable speech and constitutionally protected 
speech. 170 In order to conclude that the policy was vague, the court 
analyzed both elements necessary to state a prima facie case of 
harassment under the policy--cause and effect. l7l The court looked 
first to the policy's cause section, which stated that language must 
"stigmatize" or "victimize" a person. 172 The court reasoned that such 
terms could only be defined vaguely.173 The court reasoned that 
simply because language violates the "stigmatize" or "victimize" test 
does not mean that it is automatically unprotected by the first 
amendment. 174 The university did not clearly state the differences 
between offensive speech, which is protected under the first amend-
ment, and the "stigmatized" speech prohibited by the policy.175 Sec-
ond, the court reasoned that the policy'S effects section did not 
clearly delineate which speech was protected and which was not, 
giving students "no inherent guidance."176 Additionally, although 
the university provided an accompanying pamphlet containing ex-
amples of prohibited conduct and speech with the initial policy, it 
withdrew the pamphlet later in the semester. 177 Since "the Univer-
sity never articulated any principled way to distinguish sanctionable 
from protected speech," students at the university had no clear 
method of understanding what speech would later be sanctioned. 178 
Thus, a university interested in drafting a policy restricting 
speech must ensure that the wording of its policy does not allow 
vague interpretations such as the initial policy at the University of 
Michigan. 179 To provide warning to its students, a university should 
include examples of sanctionable conduct in a policy. 180 In addition, 
169 Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 867 (E.D. Mich. 1989). 
170 [d. 
171 [d. 
172 [d. 
173 [d. 
174 [d. 
175 [d. 
176 [d. 
177 [d. 
178 [d. 
179 See Initial and Revised Policies, supra note 15. 
180 See supra note 18 for examples of sanctionable conduct that the University of Michigan 
and the University of Wisconsin drafted into their policies. 
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a policy should explicitly delineate standards to which university 
officials should adhere in discerning what conduct is protected by 
the first amendment and what is not. 
V. THE VICTIM'S PERSPECTIVE 
Even though policies may conflict with the first amendment, 
university officials enact such restrictions to provide students with 
an equal access to education and an academic environment free 
from interference. lSI These policies, exemplifying a university'S de-
sire to provide a community free of discrimination that fosters and 
celebrates diversity, are symbolic of our nation's commitment to 
equality and freedom from harassment embodied in the fourteenth 
amendment and civil rights statutes. IS2 Enacted in an institution that 
is symbolic of free inquiry, however, the policies bring head to head 
the "competing visions" of freedom of speech and freedom of equal-
ity for all citizens. 183 The difficult quandary is how to reconcile these 
compelling, yet conflicting, goals. 
The Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan 
recently faced this conflict and ruled that the initial policy at the 
University of Michigan was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad 
because it regulated constitutionally protected speech as well as 
regulable speech. 184 Interestingly, however, the court submitted an 
addendum to its decision. ls5 The court admitted that a recent article 
by Professor Mari Matsuda, 186 which had reached its chambers after 
1R1 Hodulik, supra note 17, at 576. 
182 The fourteenth amendment states in part: "No state shall ... deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV, § 1. Ratified 
during the same period were amendments XIII (abolishing slavery) and XV (granting Af-
rican-Americans the right to vote) to the Constitution. In addition, Congress enacted the 
Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1870, 1871, and 1875 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 1971 
et seq., 1981 et seq. (1982)). Eight decades later, with impetus from Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (applying the fourteenth amendment, the Court ruled that 
schools did not provide equal educational opportunities for African-Americans), Congress 
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h(6) (1982), and the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973p (1982)). Other federal legislation and 
state statutes may also mandate equal access to education. See, e.g., Hodulik, supra note 17. 
As counsel for the University of Wisconsin, Ms. Hodulik described the statutes upon which 
the university based its policy. Id. at 576-77. 
183 Flint, A Din on the Campus, Boston Globe, Oct. 8, 1989, at A25, col. 2 (quoting 
Professor Laurence Tribe). 
184 Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 864, 867 (E.D. Mich. 1989). 
185 Id. at 869. 
186 Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 2320 (1989). 
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the docketing of its opinion, would have indeed "sharpened the 
Court's view of the issues."!87 The court's late recognition of Mat-
suda's work suggests that perhaps it may have been willing to carve 
out some exception to first amendment rights by balancing them 
against fourteenth amendment considerations. 
Professor Matsuda argues in favor of a free speech exception 
for a narrowly defined class of hate speech that "acknowledges both 
the civil libertarian's fear of tyranny and the victims' experience of 
loss of liberty in a society that tolerates racist speech."!88 Reasoning 
from the victim's perspective, she notes that the victims in our 
society bear much of the burden of maintaining unfettered free 
speech.!89 Since the psychological and sociological damage caused 
by racist slurs is great while the societal value in such speech is low, 
government should be able to regulate a narrowly defined class of 
racist words.!90 She argues for a legal answer to racist speech by 
specifically allowing the government to regulate speech if the "mes-
sage is of racial inferiority; ... directed against a historically op-
pressed group; and ... is persecutorial, hateful, and degrading."!9! 
In the university setting, she argues, it is even more important to 
prohibit racist speech because students depend on the university 
for their sense of community.!92 Allowing such speech at a university 
harms the attackers by allowing them to believe their actions will be 
tolerated for the rest of their lives. It harms the institution itself, as 
such speech is antithetical to the mission of a university. Most of all, 
however, it hurts the victims, as they have no recourse.!93 Not only 
have the victims been verbally abused, they have been victimized by 
a university that has chosen not to respond in the name of toler-
ance.!94 Thus, the state should be permitted to restrict the first 
187 Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 869. 
188 Matsuda, supra note 186, at 2380. 
189 Id. at 2376. 
190 Id. at 2340. 
191 Id. at 2357. 
192 Id. at 2370; see also Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and 
Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171,207 (1990) ("[a] university ... is also a unique 
community in which the state should be permitted to require of its members higher levels of 
rationality and civility than the state may impose on the general population."). 
193 Matsuda, supra note 186, at 2371. 
194 Matsuda discusses the effects of governmental tolerance of racist speech. Id. at 2338. 
She also discusses the specific tolerance by university officials that is "more harmful than 
generalized tolerance in the community-at-Iarge." Id. at 2371; see Wright, Racist Speech and 
the First Amendment, 9 MISS. C.L. REV. 1 (1988). Wright discusses judicial toleration, reasoning 
that toleration of racist speech indicates not so much "the virtue of tolerance" as it does 
"indifference and insensitivity" to nondominant groups. Id. at 28. 
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amendment rights of verbal attackers "as a condition for [their] 
entry into this special community."I95 Matsuda concludes thatgov-
ernment should combat hateful speech, "not because it isn't really 
speech, not because it falls within a hoped-for neutral exception, 
but because it is wrong."I96 
Other commentators have also tried to reconcile these two com-
mitments, free speech and equality, with respect to racist speech. 197 
As Professor Charles Lawrence argued, "[t]o engage in a debate 
about the first amendment and racist speech without a full under-
standing of the nature and extent of the harm of racist speech risks 
making the first amendment an instrument of domination rather 
than a vehicle of liberation."198 He speaks poignantly about the 
difference between offensive, impolite language as found in Cohen 
and the harms caused by racist slurs: psychic injury, shame, vulner-
ability, and fear. 199 He would solve this balancing test by expanding 
the "fighting words" exception to include racist speech.20o He dif-
ferentiates the traditional "fighting words" doctrine requirement of 
an uncontrollable violent reaction, with the typical response by the 
victim of a racial epithet, flight or silence. 201 He argues that this 
response is just as severe as a violent reaction.202 Victims are left 
speechless, powerless, and fearful of physical abuse.203 Anti-Semitic, 
racist, or sexist verbal abuse causes actual physical symptoms, tem-
porarily disabling and muting the victim.204 Regulations that curtail 
such speech are therefore "clearly within the spirit, if not the letter, 
of existing first amendment doctrine."205 
To counter this argument, some commentators argue that the 
extension of the "fighting words" exception to include racist speech 
would be detrimental in several ways.206 First, the drafting of such 
195 Smolia, supra note 192, at 207. 
196 Matsuda, supra note 186, at 2380. 
197 Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 445 (1987); Lawrence, 
supra note 5; Wright, supra note 194; Smolia, supra note 192. 
198 Lawrence, supra note 5. 
199 [d. 
200 [d. 
201 [d. 
202 [d. 
203 [d. 
204 [d. 
205 !d. 
206 See, e.g., Address by Nadine Strossen, ACLU Biennial Conference, at 8 (june 15, 
1989). Ms. Strossen is General Counsel for the ACLU. 
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narrow policies is nearly impossible, and would give too much dis-
cretion to those enforcing it. 207 Second, the racist speakers may 
themselves become martyrs of the first amendment, increasing the 
publicity of, and sympathy for, their racist message. 208 Last, the 
policy would only cover open, public racist speech, not eliminating 
the "more subtle, ... more invidious, forms .... "209 
Although first amendment doctrine indicates that universities 
must draft narrow, unambiguous policies in order to regulate in a 
constitutionally permissible manner, the district court in Doe indi-
cated its willingness to factor in fourteenth amendment considera-
tions in its analysis of the issue. Matsuda's and Lawrence's views of 
victims' rights deserve to be heard on the university campus to 
enlighten the university community as to the effects of racist speech. 
As universities attempt to provide a harassment-free environment 
for their students by enacting disciplinary policies, they will provide 
a testing ground for a rethinking of first amendment doctrine. 21o 
As commentators noted in the preceding section have suggested, 
such a rethinking should not ignore the victims' perspective in the 
name of toleration. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In an effort to guide university administrators, this Note has 
analyzed the constitutionality of university anti-harassment policies 
designed to counteract racist, anti-Semitic, sexist, and homophobic 
expression on campus. As an overriding principle, the Court has 
upheld the first amendment guarantees of free speech in a broad 
manner. Government cannot suppress speech due to its content or 
offensiveness, especially in an educational environment where un-
inhibited dialectic is paramount. The Court has carved out a few 
narrow exceptions to this broad principle in which government, in 
the form of a public university, may regulate. 
First, a university may regulate expression when the attacker 
uses "fighting words." The Court has interpreted such words nar-
rowly, only prohibiting expression in face-to-face encounters in 
which unusually provocative words addressed to a victim provoke 
an uncontrollable, immediate act of violence in that victim. Second, 
207 [d. 
208 [d. 
209 [d. 
210 See generally Smolla, supra note 192. 
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a university may regulate expression that incites or produces im-
minent lawless action in a group, as long as policies do not prohibit 
mere advocacy. On the other hand, university administrators should 
not include broad provisions aimed at criminalizing group defa-
mation as it appears that such statutes are probably not constitu-
tional. 
If a university chooses to enact a policy, it must draft the policy 
narrowly so that it does not affect speech protected by the first 
amendment. Also, drafters must ensure that the narrow wording 
will not be interpreted vaguely. University officials admit that nar-
row drafting would not permit the university to prohibit most 
speech. Ironically, it is unlikely that such narrow policies would 
cover the types of speech that led to the policy's creation.211 
Even narrowly tailored policies, however, at least symbolize that 
universities are concerned about their underrepresented groups, 
even though the policies may not reduce racist behavior signifi-
cantly. In addition to narrow drafting, the policy should also ex-
plicitly delineate standards to which university officials must adhere 
in discerning what conduct the first amendment protects. At the 
very least, universities must include a method of reviewing com-
plaints for constitutionality before sending notice of the complaint 
to the alleged perpetrator. Last, to provide warning to their stu-
dents, universities should include examples of sanctionable conduct 
in a policy. 
Although universities cannot legislate against most racist speech 
under current jurisprudence, the unfortunate recent rise in re-
ported incidents and the emergence of progressive legal commen-
tary may provide the impetus for a change in the law toward reg-
ulation of hate speech in narrow instances. In any event, 
administrators should realize that disciplining a narrow classification 
of speech is not the entire solution. Universities, which have an 
important function in our society as institutions dedicated to higher 
learning and truth, must enlighten their students by implementing 
educational programs in their curricula and providing seminars that 
raise cultural awareness. Universities should not only educate their 
students as to the roots of racism, anti-Semitism, sexism, and 
homophobia, but they should also force students to grapple with 
our country's competing commitments of equality and free speech. 
Most importantly, even though universities must tolerate constitu-
211 Hodulik, supra note 17, at 587. 
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tionally protected speech, the Constitution does not mandate that 
they agree with it. If they are truly committed to combating racism, 
sexism, anti-Semitism, and homophobia on campus, universities 
should not hesitate to exercise their own first amendment rights of 
free speech to denounce unconscionable student behavior. 
Susan M. Finegan 
